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Abstract. International trade law has developed impressively around
the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement understanding.
Member states can bring claims for anything from unfair tariff rates to
a violation of agreements on services, intellectual property, or food
safety. Whereas wealthier member states like the United States have a
domestic legal counsel to manage their caseloads, developing countries
rely instead on private international law firms. This paper reviews
private law firm’s role in the WTO, and analyzes some practitioner
testimony from the International Immersion Program—Switzerland on
the effect of law firms on developing international trade law precedent.
It concludes by proposing ways to align firm incentives with their client
states and the WTO.
INTRODUCTION
A body of scholarship has developed around the role of private actors in
international trade law, but the focus is primarily on NGOs or corporations rather
than private international law firms.1 Customary international law,2 human rights
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1 Joel P. Trachtma and Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in
WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 Harv. Intl. L. J. 221 (2003).
2 See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1132 (1999) (“we deny the claim that CIL is an exogenous influence on
states’ behavior.”). For a discussion on the opposing view see Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory
and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23
Mich. J. Int’l L. 143, 160 (2001).
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law,3 and humanitarian law4 are not particularly effective at influencing the actions
of states and their officials. In contrast, international trade law has been empirically
connected to changing state policies through the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
dispute settlement understanding.5
WTO litigation involves both rich and poor countries with drastically different
interests over trade disputes worth millions. Yet most member states do not have
their own domestic legal counsel to manage and argue their caseloads.6 Introducing
private law firms into the litigation process inevitably includes distinct interests into
the WTO system. Particularly for poorer member states, who have little choice but to
utilize private law firms, understanding the relationship between public and private

See Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (2014) (arguing that purposefully
unenforceable human rights treaties contribute to the world’s failure to address human
rights violations effectively).
4 See Xavier Philippe, Sanctions for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The
Problem of the Division of Competences Between National Authorities and Between
National and International Authorities, 90 Intl Rev. of the Red Cross, 359, 360 (2008)
(“ineffectiveness of sanctions for serious violations of international humanitarian law is due
to…the incapacity of the bodies responsible for the control of international humanitarian
law to discharge their task.”).
5 See Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2013: A Statistical
Analysis, 17 J. Int’l Econ. L. 191 (2014) (examining complaints and decisions, and
connecting these measures with compliance with international trade law); Andrew T.
Guzman and Beth Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation
and Settlement at the WTO, 31 J. Leg. Stud. S205 (2002) (identifies factors that cause
disputes to move from negotiation to panel stage); Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24
Fordham Int’l L.J. 158 (2000) (arguing that the “point here is not that the institution is
ineffective, but rather that…whatever positive effect it has on a defendant’s willingness to
liberalize occurs prior to rulings, in the form of early settlement.”).
6 World Trade Organization, Developing Countries,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap6_e.pdf
(displaying that about two thirds of the WTO’s members are developing countries); see also
Trade and Development Center, Establishing the Advisory Center on WTO Law,
www.itd.org/links/acwladvis.htm; DSU, Art. 27, para. 2 (enabling all least developed
countries are automatically eligible for free legal advice from the Secretariat).
3
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interests in the context of WTO litigation is important. Thus, this paper looks
specifically at international law firms as private actors and their impact on
international trade disputes.
International law firms are profit maximizing and this inevitably has an influence
on the shape of international trade law as it develops a distinguished body of
precedent. This paper argues that international law firms operate counter to the
goals of the WTO—namely, to support a more globalized society with reduced trade
barriers and economic integration. Part I provides a short review of the WTO and the
role of private actors, including international law firms. Part II examines research
findings from IIP—Switzerland. Part III analyzes the findings and proposes some
burden-shifting changes that might help align law firm incentives with the interests
of the WTO. The paper concludes that further research must be done to determine
the significance of law firm-driven litigation and whether it has an observable impact
on compliance with international trade law or modifies the behavior of states in
furtherance of WTO interests.
I. REVIEW OF THE WTO, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRMS
World Trade Organization. The WTO publicly holds the position that it is an
organization for liberalizing trade, a forum for governments to negotiate trade
agreements, and a place to settle trade disputes.7 It has effectively reduced

World Trade Organization, What is the World Trade Organization?,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm; see also Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33
ILM 1144 (1994).
7
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transaction costs in the long run by applying agreed upon rules and channeling
dispute resolution through legitimate avenues.8 With more states applying for
membership each year, the WTO is continuing to develop a legitimate and strong
body of case law to enforce future international trade disputes. 9 As many
international institutions hope to accomplish, the WTO has become the leading global
governance institution for international trade, providing rule-making and ruleimplementation on a global scale.10
As a hard law institution, the WTO has distinct effects on the role of private actors
in international trade.11 It systematically keeps the formal dispute settlement system
closed to private actors.12 But because the WTO functions as a series of self-enforcing
agreements, private actors play a vital role. For poorer member states in particular,
cooperation and interdependence with private actors is vital to achieving the same
levels of enforcement. Generally, however, both poorer and wealthier member states
no longer are the sole players within the WTO’s structure. Countries cooperate with

Alan M. Rugman and Alain Verbeke, Towards a Theory of Regional Multinationals: A
Transaction Cost Economics Approach, 45 Mgmt. Int’l. Rev. 5, 7 (2005) (discussing the
organic nature of economic integration in regional clusters, and attributing the decrease in
transaction costs to businesses operating within the structure of the WTO rather than
strategic intentions of state governments).
9 World Trade Organization, Members and Observers,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (displaying the date of
membership for all 160 members of the WTO).
10 Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo, and Dorothee Baumann, Global Rules and
Private Actors – Towards a New Role of the Transactional Corporation in Global
Governance, 16 Bus. Ethics Q. 505, 510 (2006).
11 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 Int’l Org. 421, 430 (2000).
12 Christina Knahr, Participation of Non-State Actors in the Dispute Settlement System of
the WTO: Benefit or Burden? 63 (2007) (discussing the current debate on whether private
actors can participate in the dispute resolution process by submitting amicus curiae briefs).
8
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private actors at different stages of the dispute settlement process to effectively
operate within the system.13
Private Actors in General. Large transnational corporations and other private
actors have not always been recognized for their contributions to international law.
Recently their activities have been connected to important peace-keeping functions,
social and environmental policy implementation, and human rights standards. 14 In
the field of international trade law, private actors provide a unique information
sharing function.15 Private actors can provide legal, economic, scientific, or other
expertise that serves as the basis for state claims in the WTO.16 While scholarship
focuses on NGOs or private business participation, this paper is mostly concerned
with private law firms and their incentive structure while operating as counsel to
members within the WTO dispute settlement process.

Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceição, Katell Le Goulven, and Ronald U. Mendoza, Providing
Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (2003) (discussing the concept of Global
Public Goods and the influence of private actors in creating global externalities).
14 David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 931, 983 (2004)
(discussing private actors and their efforts to protect human rights); Thomas W. Dunfee
and Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and the Adapted Firm, 36
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 563 (2003) (discussing private actors and their peacekeeping
functions); Andreas Georg Scherer and Marc Smid, The Downward Spiral and the U.S.
Model Business Principles. Why MNEs Should Take Responsibility for the Improvement of
World-wide Social and Environmental Conditions, 40 Mgmt. Int’l. Rev. 351 (2000)
(discussing private actors and their impact on social and environmental policies).
15 Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. of Int’l Econ. Law. 861, 869
(2005).
16 Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo, and Dorothee Baumann, Global Rules and
Private Actors – Towards a New Role of the Transactional Corporation in Global
Governance, 16 Bus. Ethics Q. 505 (2006).
13
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Private International Law Firms. Fairly early in WTO history, with Bananas III
in 1997, the appellate body recognized that member states could be represented by
private law firms in oral arguments.17 Bananas III involved a request from the
government of Saint Lucia to allow two private legal counsel to represent the country
in appellate oral arguments.18 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, nor pre-existing customary international law
explicitly denied countries the ability to utilize private legal counsel.19 The panel and
appellate body recognized that besides oral arguments, member states regularly used
private law firms for assistance with preparing documents, writing responses to
questions from the panel, or preparing arguments.20 In their report, the appellate
body summarily stated that “representation by counsel of a government’s own choice
may well be a matter of particular significance – especially for developing-country
Members – to enable them to participate fully in dispute settlement proceedings.” 21
The appellate body must have seen private law firm participation as a positive for
the poorer member states given its brief and confident statement that private legal
counsel could be used.22 This position is even more convincing considering the WTO’s

European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
Appellate Body Report adopted on 17 November 1997, WTO Document WT/DS27/AB/R, 6,
paras 10-12 (“Bananas III”).
18 Bananas III, at 6, paras 10-12.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Anne Marie Slaughter Burley and Walter Mattli, Europe before the Court: A Political
Theory of Legal Integration 47 Int.Org. 41, 58-62 (1993) (arguing that “self-interest” binds
state and private actors and that “opportunities” offered by the legal system create personal
incentives for individual litigants and their lawyers).
17
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dedication to a fair dispute resolution process for all members.23 While wealthier
member states can afford to use domestic legal counsel and still contract with private
firms to lighten the preparatory work, this is not a realistic option for poorer member
states. Still, it is less obvious that the appellate body balanced the benefit to poorer
member states with the costs that private law firms might impose on the WTO system
as a whole.
Opportunities for Private Actor Participation. The litigation process for WTO
disputes involves pre-litigation, litigation, and post-litigation opportunities for state
and private actor involvement.24 The pre-litigation period depends on private
businesses or injured parties identifying and reporting to their government a policy
that is inconsistent with international trade law. This is an area where private actors;
economists, NGOs, businesses, law firms, etc., can participate in international trade
law the most. Because of the extremely high costs of litigation in this area, it tends
to be the role of private actors to convince their government of the merits of their
claim, as well as the benefits that the country can gain through litigation.25 In the
pre-litigation process, once states agree to take on the case, the same private actors
also have the opportunity to develop legal arguments and help prepare to address the
panel. The key difference between countries with domestic legal counsel versus

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol.
31, 33 ILM 1226 (1994).
24 Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. of Intl Econ. Law. 861, 869
(2005).
25 Id.
23
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private international legal counsel is the level of control over the litigation. Countries
with their own legal counsel can ultimately withhold certain arguments while poorer
member states are in less of a position to challenge the expertise of their counsel.
During the litigation process, states can have legal counsel that manages the case
entirely, produces briefs, acquires evidence, and develops strategies and arguments.26
Often they contract with private law firms to complete the preparatory work related
to the panel proceedings. Poorer member states turn to private international law
firms for this function and often do not have the resources to manage their caseloads
through domestic legal counsel. This period of the litigation process is possibly where
the incentives of private law firms and member states is most widely misaligned.
If the costs of litigating within the WTO are too high then poorer member states
may not have a reason to litigate their issues in court, even if the issue has merit.27
Moreover, wealthier member states may know they can raise the cost of litigation for
the poorer members and de facto win the dispute. In order to avoid external acts of
retribution, the WTO does provide legal services to poorer members.28 However, as
argued later in this paper, the goal should be a movement towards member states
having their own domestic legal counsel with incentives that align with their client.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 868.
28 See Trade and Development Center, Establishing the Advisory Center on WTO Law,
www.itd.org/links/acwladvis.htm; DSU, Art. 27, para. 2 (“Secretariat shall make available a
qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing
country Member which so requests.”).
26
27
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After the case is decided, there is still the need to remove any policy found in
violation of international trade laws at home, or to observe its removal abroad.
Private actors can help induce compliance with the rulings, and businesses
specifically can inform members whether anything has changed.29 For law firms, this
post-litigation period is less significant when discussing incentives.
II. IIP—SWITZERLAND RESEARCH FINDINGS
Legal practitioners in Geneva are in agreement about the important role law firms
play in international trade law today. A schism appears when discussing the
implications of an international dispute resolution system driven by private law firms
rather than independent state bodies and their domestic legal counsel. This paper
analyzes commentary made by legal practitioners working in international trade law.
The following information provides insight into the current state of international
trade law and about its future in relation to the prevalence of private law firms. These
statements represent some of the talking points concerning the effect that private
law firms may have on the system.
Practitioner 1. The WTO is focused on creating long term systematic changes to
facilitate international trade among member states. This means creating and
enforcing an international trade law regime that is consistently applied to all member
states. Countries that engage in the dispute resolution process act in one sense to win
cases, but in another to avoid creating dangerous precedents. In particular, state

29

Supra note 15 at 870.
9

legal counsels tend to act conservatively when determining legal arguments to
present to the panel or appellate body. Their decisions reflect on the political positions
of their country and may introduce legal precedents that can be used against them in
the future.
Law firms are distinct from state legal counsel because they act strategically to
increase payoffs. While states would prefer shorter litigation as repeat players that
internalize the costs, firms hired primarily by developing countries are focused on
maximizing profits. This translates to a widely different set of incentives focused on
winning the case at hand and making as much money as possible in the process. As
a result, more time is spent litigating and more complex legal issues are brought in
front of the panel without regard to their consequences for the client or the WTO in
the future.
Private international law firms with radically different interests in the litigation
may threaten to counteract the international legal goals of the WTO. Whereas state
legal counsel support a simplified set of precedents and a succinct body of
international trade law, private law firms question existing precedents and dig
deeper into procedural aspects of cases. WTO rules and standards have become more
complex, and law firms are burdening the panel with their profit maximizing
behavior.
Practitioner 2. It is not immediately obvious to me that private law firms are
harmful to the WTO when developing countries only bring about twenty-five percent
of the claims. Private law firms are good for developing countries who cannot afford
10

to hire their own domestic citizens to represent them as legal counsel. They also
increase the quality of legal representation for the developing country and support
actual competition of ideas in litigation against the more developed countries. Private
law firms do bring more complex cases and more procedural cases, but this could be
an effect of the natural sophistication of the law, which is a good thing. Private law
firms are not necessarily bad because even if they are arguing more complex
procedural issues in order to maximize their own profits, the appellate body can
decide the case and develop a more legitimate legal institution.
III. ALIGNING PRIVATE LAW FIRM INCENTIVES WITH WTO AND STATE INTERESTS
The role of private actors should be aligned with the goals of the WTO and the
functions it upholds.30 While private businesses or NGOs are lobbying member states
through Doha Rounds to set the stage for the WTO in the future, they currently have
the greatest opportunity to make an impact in the dispute resolution system through
the pre-litigation process.31 In contrast, private law firms are currently in a better
position to make an impact on the dispute resolution process at every stage.32
Therefore, whether or not law firms share the same incentives as their clients and as

Supra note 7.
See Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. of Intl Econ. Law. 861, 869
(2005) (discussing the scope of involvement that private actors can have during the dispute
resolution process); see also Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 158 (2000)
(arguing that the “point here is not that the institution is ineffective, but rather
that…whatever positive effect it has on a defendant’s willingness to liberalize occurs prior
to rulings, in the form of early settlement.”).
32 Supra note 15.
30
31
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the WTO may have measurable effects on the direction that international trade law
develops in. A perverse set of incentives may impact the implementation of the WTO’s
major functions. If we are concerned with the incentives of private law firms as
Practitioner 1 is, and think that they are unduly burdening the system, there are
several burden-shifting solutions available. Alternatively, as Practitioner 2 suggests,
law firms may not be the issue and may simply reflect the WTO’s increasing
sophistication.
Placing the Burden on Firms. Currently there are minimal burdens placed on the
extent or role of private law firms while participating in the litigation process for
dispute resolution in the WTO.33 As Practitioner 1 discussed, this seems to make case
outcomes needlessly complex due to the different incentives that firms have compared
to their clients. The WTO could shift the burden on law firms themselves and
establish flat limits on pay or type of pay, limits on billable hours, or limits on
discovery to try and align incentives.
The issue with placing the burden on firms themselves, however, is that they can
also shift these transaction costs to their clients. In theory, placing any burden on
firms will lead to undesirable results for poorer member states and create greater
problems than it solves. Any type of pay limit on international legal counsel would
create a massive regulatory regime with clear enforcement issues. It would
significantly reduce the quality of representation for poorer member states. If they

33

See Bananas III.
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are willing to pay more for better legal service they would not be permitted to meet
the higher rates. Perhaps this would drive law firms to take on cases in a pro bono
capacity. In any event, the poorer clients would not have to pay, but would be worse
off if the quality of legal counsel decreases. An alternative might be prohibiting a
specific form of payment to begin with; but more research must be done on payment
arrangements and whether this is viable for international trade law disputes.
Regulating billable hours internationally would be an extreme approach to this
issue. Billable hour limits run into the same issues with enforcement and regulation
as the flat pay limits do.34 Firms would need to voluntarily establish these types of
limits, and hope that it signals to their client that they value the quality over the
quantity of legal work and firm revenues.35 This might be possible considering
perceived affects that billable hours have on firm culture or performance.36 But as
with other burden shifting solutions, firms could shift the cost to their clients and
simply charge more for less time. More cynically, a billable hour limit might create

See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in
the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 621,
658 n.171 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of regulating the number of hours worked in
the legal profession, but proposing that it offers cultural benefits to the firm); Susan Saab
Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture,
and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 239, 297 n.344 (2000)
(discussing how the legal profession is a distinctly difficult regulatory framework compared
to medicine or health).
35 See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction,
Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 239,
297 (2000).
36 See Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong With Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to
Law Firm Short-Termism, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2014) (discussing the wide recognition
among partners, associates, and clients that law firms need a structural change to address
their shared discontent with the legal profession).
34
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less transparency in the system by driving payment under the table or incentivizing
firms to obfuscate their billable hour information.
There has already been discussions on discovery limits in the United States that
can inform a similar change to the WTO. On one hand, limits on the evidence that a
party can provide for their case will deny firms the opportunity to engage in
significantly burdensome “information inflation” during the discovery process.37 But
on the other hand, a limit on the discovery process could make it more difficult for
firms to win the case for their client.38 For example, a simple unfair tariff case would
need less evidence to show a violation of most favored nation treatment than a case
involving anti-dumping duties. United States judges and academics are already
concerned about how e-discovery inflates courts with information and drives up the
costs of litigation, but the remedy is left to the judiciary.39 Similarly, if the WTO
wanted to establish discovery limits, it should create precedents and directly speak
to the minimum or maximum set of documents that legal counsel needs to argue their
case for a given issue.

See Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on ‘Information
Inflation’ and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, 17 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 9 (2011)
(discussing problems with discovery in the context of e-discovery).
38 Id.
39 See Pension Comm. Of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing the concern for rising costs of litigation);
Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on ‘Information
Inflation’ and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, 17 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 9, 4[5] (2011)
(arguing that when litigation has experienced abuse in the discovery process, courts find
the remedy themselves).
37
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It is also important to consider a concern about the premise of these burden
shifting solutions. As Practitioner 2 speaks to, it is not clear that a different set of
incentives for law firms is a bad thing. The domestic United States legal system is
familiar with the law firm’s profit maximizing behavior, and responds in extreme
cases through judicially applied enforcement mechanisms.40 This suggests that any
solution to misaligned incentives should be internalized by the WTO panel or
appellate body.
Placing the Burden on the WTO. As discussed above, placing the burden on law
firms to change their incentives harms their client member states in a way that might
not be ideal given the WTO’s goals. Instead the WTO could consider institutional or
procedural changes to the panel or appellate body. Placing a larger proportion of
funds into the WTO Secretariat to represent poorer member states seems like a stopgap solution.41 If the WTO had the capacity to fully represent any dispute taking
place in the WTO, poorer member states might switch to this service. But more likely,
increasing funds would lead to minor changes. If member states value better quality
legal service over the marginal cost of litigation, then a qualitative change to the
Secretariat would need to occur to justify the transition.

See Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?. 42 McGeorge L. Rev. 149 (2010)
(addressing the issue of regulating attorney conduct by analyzing best practices); see also
Christopher J. Whelan and Neta Ziv, Privatizing Professionalism: Client Control of
Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 2577, 2580 (2012) (discussing legal enforcement
mechanisms through the dichotomy of state judicial system versus self-regulation).
41 See Trade and Development Center, Establishing the Advisory Center on WTO Law,
www.itd.org/links/acwladvis.htm; DSU, Art. 27, para. 2 (“the Secretariat shall make
available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any
developing country Member which so requests.”).
40
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Another solution is imposing a strict word or page limit on official documents. This
institutional change would limit the complexity of panel decisions by forcing them to
address the legal issues more concisely. Judges already have this in mind, however,
and a strict limit may decrease the interpretability of their decisions for some of the
more complex cases. Furthermore, a page or word limit does not directly take away
the law firm’s incentives to over bill their client and overburden the panel with
evidence during discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The WTO is the global governance institution for international trade law; it
successfully lowers transaction costs and enforces international trade law on a global
scale. Law firms are one of the only private actors operating in the dispute resolution
process directly and fully. The IIP—Switzerland Practitioner responses suggest there
are opposing views about the effect that law firms have, both on their clients and on
the precedent created through the WTO appellate body. The concern about incentives
brings interesting issues to light, but whether or not law firms make a measurably
significant impact on the law remains to be seen. Further research must be done to
determine questions such as whether law firms actually benefit their poorer member
state clients, whether they do bring more complex or procedural legal arguments to
the appellate body, and whether their effects can be connected to compliance or
changing member state behavior in furtherance of WTO interests.
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